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Abstract 
Andrews et al present a form of instrumental adaptationism that is designed to test the hypothesis that a 
given trait is an adaptation.  This epistemological commitment aims to make clear statements about 
behavioural natural kinds.  The instrumental logic is sound but it is the limits of our empirical imagination 
that can cause problems for theory construction. 
  
  
Andrews, Gangestad and Matthews (AGM) have proffered a form of instrumentalism that renders 
adaptationism the experimental hypothesis, and exaptation, constraint and spandrels the null hypotheses, in 
a universe of only four sources of design.  They provide evidentiary criteria that can be used to determine 
possible adaptations and in order to think about their useful metric an example is offered: 
  
Stimulus equivalence (SE) involves the formation of derived relations between a set of stimuli which 
resembles a mathematical equivalence set.  Such sets exhibit the properties of identity, symmetry and 
transitivity (Sidman et al, 1982).  In the behavioural sciences the interest is in the emergence of these 
relational properties spontaneously, in the absence of formal reinforcement or informational feedback, after 
a minimum number of trained links between the stimuli have been established, typically by employing an 
arbitrary matching-to-sample procedure.  For example, two 3-member classes of A1-B1-C1 and A2-B2-C2 
might be formed as follows. First A1-B1 and A2-B2 relations would be trained, by means of informational 
feedback. The first stimulus mentioned in a pair - such as A1 - denotes the sample stimulus and the second 
- B1 - constitutes the correct comparison stimulus, following A1, to choose from the array of comparison 
stimuli (here just B1 and B2). In a series of individual trials, participants learn to select B1 from this array 
when A1 has been presented, and B2 when A2 is the sample.  Then B1-C1 and B2-C2 are similarly trained, 
the Bs now serving as samples and the Cs as comparisons.  Any kind of stimuli can be used in this 
paradigm, and the relations between them are usually purely arbitrary, to be learned within the experiment, 
and independent of prior experience. 
  
Formation of an SE class requires satisfying conjointly, in unreinforced tests, the 3 criteria listed above.  
Identity, such as selecting A1 when A1 and A2 are presented as comparisons after A1 has served as 
sample - is normally assumed in humans.  Presenting B1 as a sample with A1 and A2 as comparisons 
constitutes a test of symmetry as the subject has to pick A1 from an array, inverting the trained relation. 
Other tests of symmetry would be B2-A2, C1-B1 and C2-B2.  Presenting A1 as a sample with C1 and C2 
as comparison tests transitivity, to achieve which the subject has to choose C1, and similarly for A2-C2.  
Finally presenting C1as sample, with A1 and A2 as comparisons, and the subject expected to choose A1, 
constitutes a combined test of symmetry and transitivity. 
  
Although most laboratory animals can acquire the basic trained relations of arbitrary matching-to-sample, 
the general consensus within the field is that the ability to form SE classes is peculiar to humans. 
Consequently some theorise that SE emerges as a by-product of learning to name (Horne and Lowe, 1996), 
others that SE is a necessary precursor to language (Dickins and Dickins, 2001).  Both camps see a 
fundamental relationship between symbolic behaviour and SE because symbols are arbitrary 
representations tied to classes of objects, events and states of affairs.  In this way a symbol and its relata 
constitute an SE class.  In this paper we will regard any putative SE mechanism as a rudimentary symbol 
machine.  Symbols have uses not only in language, but also in arithmetical processing, mathematical 
reasoning etc.  It is not inconceivable that SE had some cognitive benefit for our species.  How might we 
apply AGM’s metric to further this conception? 
  
Although SE appears to be human-specific, Tonneau (2001) argues that SE might be a form of functional 
equivalence (a term used to refer to a group of stimuli which share the same behavioural function, either 
because they share a common training history, or because of some other kind of transfer of function 
between them), which is seen in other species. If this is true it could push our interest further back in 
phylogenetic time. Alternatively, SE might represent an exaptation of an original functional equivalence 
mechanism.  Comparative data must be used in conjunction with other criteria such as special design, 
which is the most cogent criterion according to AGM.  But special design does not remove the possibility 
that the trait resulted from an exapted learning mechanism.  However, AGM argue that the property of 
domain-specificity, if demonstrated, might lend some weight to an adaptationist 
hypothesis.  Developmental specificity indicates a biased outcome for the mechanism involved, and 
therefore a specific selective story.  This is not straightforward for SE because it is empirically difficult to 
test pre-linguistic infants on a matching-to-sample or related paradigm and there are few ontogenetic 
studies of this ability.  Horne and Lowe (1996) claim that early word learning instils SE, but the absence of 
pre-linguistic data renders this no more than a speculation. But, even if we could overturn this empirical 
limitation, would we still be able to invoke domain-specificity as a useful criterion? 
  
If an SE mechanism is a rudimentary symbol machine SE might have been co-opted to linguistic, 
mathematical and other symbolic behaviours.  The use of the term co-opted is deliberate - if SE is the 
bedrock of such behaviours, those elements that differentiate, say, linguistic symbols from general abstract 
SE classes could be the product of later evolutionary innovations, i.e. language-specific mechanisms.  As 
such, any apparent exaptation of function might not lie within the original mechanism at all but within the 
subsequent processing of its output by new mechanisms evolved for highly specific functions.  In other 
words, a linguistic symbol, at its most basic, is part of an SE class and the same is true for a mathematical 
symbol, and so on.  The SE mechanism is still just producing SE classes as “before” but this time in a 
different domain.  And this is critical, for the notion of domain-specificity used here is of a reasonably 
coarse grain, for SE classes can be formed between any kind of stimuli but possibly only under certain 
conditions.  Words are more than rudimentary symbols, having grammatical properties endowed by 
language-specific mechanisms.  However, when we see linguistic behaviour we are also seeing SE 
behaviour and it is this that presents us with a problem.  The predominance of high-order symbol crunching 
mechanisms might make the telling of the developmental story about SE empirically intractable, just as 
linguistic and mathematical effects might mask SE effects in the lab.  This might only be because of the 
reliance upon informational feedback in current empirical scenarios. 
  
We are making a point about exapted learning mechanisms.  AGM argue that a learning mechanism will 
initially be selected within a particular problem-space.  This mechanism can then be exapted to output 
different functions leading to the mechanism producing either the old and the new function or only the 
new.  However, looking at the problems facing the SE investigation we potentially have an original 
learning mechanism, for a relatively broad problem domain, with an output that has subsequently become 
the input for novel cognitive mechanisms. The function of this SE mechanism has not changed but its 
outputs might have been parasitized. None the less, it might well be that the possession of an SE 
mechanism set the initial conditions for language evolution etc.  The question of the adaptive status of a 
putative SE mechanism still remains - a problem that perhaps represents the limitations of our empirical 
imagination. 
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